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Against the broader context of donor pluralism, trilateral 
development cooperation (TDC) has received renewed interest 
within development policy circles, with supporters arguing that 
TDC reflects the changing geographies of aid and helps to forge 
new, more equitable global development partnerships. China has 
demonstrated a growing openness to TDC and engaged with a 
number of traditional donors in trilateral projects ranging from 
agriculture to healthcare. However, there has been scant fieldwork-
based TDC research and even less concentrating on China’s 
engagement, in particular. This paper seeks to fill this gap by 
focusing on one of China’s first trilateral projects with traditional 
donors in Africa – its engagement with the United Kingdom (UK) 
on a cassava project in Uganda. Drawing on fieldwork conducted in 
2016, this paper details key coordination challenges during the 
project implementation phase, and more importantly, critically 
examines two oft-claimed TDC “advantages”: its contribution to a 
more horizontal and equilateral development partnership and its 
role in providing recipient countries with more suitable technical 
assistance. The paper illustrates how the inclusion of a Southern 
donor like China, which mainly serves as a provider of technical 
assistance in this trilateral arrangement, does not necessarily lead 
to a more horizontal development partnership between the 
traditional donor (UK) and the recipient (Uganda). The similarities 
between the Southern donor and the recipient in terms of 
development capacities, challenges, and experiences do not 
naturally guarantee technology transfer success, which instead 
hinges on a deep and contextualized understanding of 
development differences, in this case, in the cassava sector 
between China and Uganda. This paper cautions against the 
tendency to assimilate shared identity and development 
experiences between the South-South TDC components.
SAIS-CARI WORKING PAPER 
NO. 20 | OCTOBER 2018: 
“China-Britain-Uganda: 
Trilateral Development 
Cooperation in Agriculture”
by Hang Zhou
WWW.SAIS-CARI.ORG/PUBLICATIONS4
CHINA-BRITAIN-UGANDA: TDC IN AGRICULTURE
IN NOVEMBER 2012, DURING THE SECOND AFRICA-BRITAIN-CHINA Conference on 
Agriculture and Fisheries in Beijing, China the United Kingdom (UK) announced the 
establishment of a trilateral development cooperation (TDC) program called 
“Agricultural Technology Transfer to Low-Income Countries (AgriTT).” AgriTT planned 
two pilot development projects (PDPs) to be established in Uganda and Malawi, in the 
cassava and fishery sectors, respectively.1 As one of the first TDC projects China 
initiated with Western donors in Africa, it indicated China’s growing willingness to 
foster cooperation with traditional donors in international development. China’s 2014 
white paper on foreign aid also confirmed this position, stating that China “conducted 
trilateral cooperation featuring complementary advantage with multilateral and 
bilateral assistance providers by leveraging each party’s strengths on the premise of 
fully respecting the will of recipient countries.”2
However, despite Beijing’s growing openness to TDC and the exponential growth 
of academic literature on China’s foreign aid, there has been limited fieldwork-based 
research on China’s engagement in TDC, particularly published in Chinese.3 Most 
available research concentrates on deciphering the rationales behind China and 
Western donors’ decisions to engage in TDC.4 Case studies on China’s involvement in 
specific TDC projects are limited to a few Australian fact-finding studies on China’s 
TDC engagement with New Zealand and the United States in the Asia-Pacific region.5 
Discussion about China’s TDC participation in Africa is also scant; for example, in one 
study of Sino-African agricultural engagement, French and Belgian researchers make 
only a brief mention of Chinese TDC projects, without in-depth analysis.6  
This report aims to narrow the gap by focusing on a pilot project initiated by 
China and the UK in Uganda’s cassava sector. First, this report details the project 
structure, including the management and implementing partners, and the progress 
made while fieldwork was conducted.a Secondly, the report identifies and analyzes the 
main obstacles encountered during the implementation phase of the project. Finally, 
the report reflects on some of the oft-claimed “advantages” of TDC advanced by the 
development policy community, focusing primarily on the claim that TDC’s contribute 
to more horizontal and equal North-South relations, as well as its role in bringing in 
more suitable technical assistance for recipient countries. 
This report is based on more than a month of fieldwork in Uganda, during which 
25 interviews were conducted. Two additional interviews took place in Beijing. The 
interviewees fall into two categories. The first includes those directly affiliated with the 
project, while the second includes interviewees who have different degrees of 
knowledge about the project or who have general knowledge about China’s 
development cooperation in Uganda. Fieldwork took place in Kampala and the four 
local districts where the pilot project was implemented. The author also observed land 
clearing in Masindi and training sessions for local farmers on mechanized agriculture 
and the use of imported Chinese machines in Masindi and Biiso. Official project 
ª This report accounts for the project progress as of May 2016, when fieldwork was conducted. Final project 
results can be accessed through the AgriTT learning report. See e.g. Lila Buckley, “Trilateral cooperation in ag-
riculture: Achievements and lessons from AgriTT,” International Institute for Environment and Development, 
April, 2017: 15, http://pubs.iied.org/G04145/”
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documents, materials collected on site, media sources, and online research (in English 
and Chinese) were also gathered and analyzed. 
While efforts were made to collect data reflecting the different implementing 
partners’ perspectives, the author was unable to conduct interviews with the Chinese 
Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) or the Foreign Economic Cooperation Center (FECC), 
under the MOA. Therefore, the analysis of Chinese perspectives on this project is 
primarily based on interviews with two Chinese technical assistants sent by the FECC, 
in charge of negotiating and implementing this trilateral project on behalf of the 
Chinese government, to support the implementation of AgriTT. It should be noted, 
however, that the opinions of these two Chinese experts might not reflect those of 
officials in the MOA and the FECC. As a result, this paper focuses more on the 
implementation of this trilateral project. 
The background outlines the current aid landscape in Uganda with an emphasis 
on China’s growing role, from the Ugandan perspective and provides concise 
information about the AgriTT program. The case study section details the pilots 
objectives, management structure, and implementing partners. The results discuss 
project coordination during the first year of the project, which was marked by financial 
management disagreements as well as whether TDC helps contribute to a more 
horizontal and equal North-South development partnership and whether Chinese 
technologies are more likely to be suitable in Uganda. The paper concludes by offering 
four policy recommendations. 
AID LANDSCAPE IN UGANDA
ACCORDING TO THE UGANDAN MINISTRY OF FINANCE, 31 donors provide aid to 
Uganda. The World Bank (WB), African Development Bank (ADB), European Union 
(EU), United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Department for 
International Development (DFID), and the Norwegian Agency for Development 
Cooperation (NORAD) represent the main aid providers during the 2010-2011 and 
2011-2012 fiscal years. In total, these six actors contribute about 71% of development 
aid, the other 25 development partners provide the remaining 29%.7
Uganda identifies Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Korea, and South Africa as its 
non-traditional development partners. Among these, China (and to a lesser degree 
South Korea) have a significant aid presence in Uganda.8 Chinese aid has grown 
considerably, from US$31 million in 2008-2009 to US$104 million in 2011-2012, marking 
an increase from 2% to 7% of Uganda’s total aid.9 Aid provided by non-traditional 
donors is considered to be particularly attractive because it comes without human 
rights or governance conditions, and often targets the infrastructure sector.10 Chinese 
engagement has also been viewed by the Ugandan government as being aligned with 
national priorities established under the 2010 and 2015 National Development Plans 
(NDPs), particularly when it comes to infrastructure development. For instance, the 
BACKGROUND
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Chinese have supported construction of the Kampala-Entebbe Expressway, the Karuma 
and Isimba hydropower plants, and the national information technology backbone.11 
The Ugandan government believes that non-traditional donors’ aid will continue to 
grow, that much of it will come from China, and that concessional loans from non-
traditional donors come with fewer concessions compared to loans from traditional 
donors like the WB and the ADB.12 
In the context of donor pluralism, the Second National Development Plan 2015/16 
- 2019/20 (NDPII) takes into account this global geopolitical and geo-economic change 
and highlights the need to establish an active engagement strategy with these new 
partners, especially China.13 While the Ugandan government barely mentioned China 
in its first NDP published in 2010, NDPII refers to China a number of times. The 
Ugandan government views China as an important source of funding for infrastructure 
development. To a lesser degree, China’s experience in economic transformation is 
also discussed in NDPII, particularly in 
regards to the establishment of 
industrial zones and land reforms. 
However, China has yet to 
participate in any aid coordination 
mechanisms established by the 
Ugandan government or by traditional 
OECD Development Assistance 
Committee donors in Uganda. The 
Ugandan Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industry, and Fisheries (MAAIF) has 
established an agricultural working group, which holds meetings every three months. 
The MAAIF uses this occasion to brief donors on its activities and to solicit their 
support. Additionally, traditional donors, including international organizations, have 
established the Local Development Partners Group (LDPG), which gathers all their 
heads of mission to discuss activities, policies, and recent developments in Uganda. 
Ouyang Daobing, the head of China’s Economic and Commercial Counselor’s Office in 
Uganda – MOFCOM’s antenna abroad in charge of foreign aid- was invited in June 2015 
to a meeting in the Belgian Embassy, during which he shared information about the 
“history, policy, main modalities and key projects of Chinese aid in Uganda”.15 
However, this meeting does not appear to have led to any deeper communication 
between China and the LDPG. A possible reason for the lack of further communication 
was the timing of the meeting, which took place just before a period of heavy staff 
rotations among Western embassies and before summer holidays. 
Traditional donors with a significant presence in Uganda’s agricultural sector (e.g. 
USAID, Japan International Cooperation Agency - JICA, and the Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations - FAO) also bring officers in charge of agricultural 
cooperation together on the last Tuesday of every month. This informal meeting aims 
to facilitate information exchanges on agricultural projects supported by each donor in 
order to prevent duplicated efforts. Neither staff from the Chinese embassy in Kampala 
nor Chinese agricultural experts have attended these meetings. During the author’s 
2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12
China 31.45 14.61 41.48 103.8
Table 1: Chinese aid in Uganda (Million USD)14
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fieldwork, the FAO chaired the presidency of this group and JICA held the vice-
presidency. Given that the tripartite agricultural cooperation between FAO and China 
in Uganda started in 2012 and entered into its second phase in 2016, one interviewee 
from USAID suggested, “why not ask FAO to send an invitation to the Chinese? It is 
very easy to do and it is only a meeting where people share some information.”16
AGRITT
AGRITT’s AIM IS TO FACILITATE THE TRANSFER OF CHINESE agricultural 
technologies to developing countries in Asia and Africa. It includes two main 
components. The first is to establish PDPs in low-income countries to disseminate 
Chinese agricultural technologies and practices. The second component aims to 
support Chinese, British, and researchers from other low-income Asian and African 
countries’ to undertake collaborative research projects in order to generate innovative 
solutions to improve agricultural productivity in developing countries. 
Progress was made towards the first component during the second Africa-Britain-
China Conference on Agriculture and Fisheries in November 2012. There, the Vice 
Minister of the Chinese Ministry of Agriculture and the British Ambassador to China 
signed two MOUs with the MAAIF and the Malawian Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, 
and, Water Development to establish two PDPs in the cassava and fishery sectors. 
Initially, AgriTT was expected to identify a third pilot country, ideally in Asia; however, 
a number of countries, including Myanmar, Nepal, Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Tanzania 
were approached without success due to either a lack of interest or disagreements 
between DFID country offices and China.17 Accordingly, AgriTT decided to limit itself to 
the two pilot programs in Malawi and Uganda. 
The Research Challenge Fund, which invited researchers from China, the UK, and 
other developing countries to submit collaborative proposals, was launched in support 
of AgriTT’s second aim. The Fund specifically encouraged proposals supporting the 
implementation of PDPs in Uganda and Malawi. Selected proposals received between 
£150,000 and £300,000 in funding from AgriTT. Recommended proposal themes 
included important agricultural technologies, effective value chain development, and 
the innovative sharing of agricultural knowledge. Over 135 concept notes were 
submitted, and authors of those deemed eligible were invited to submit full 
proposals.18 The Fund’s Steering Committee gathered in November 2013 and selected 12 
trilateral research projects.19 One of the selected projects, in particular, focused on 
analyzing the development of the cassava value chain in China and looking into how 
Chinese technologies could be adapted to the local Ugandan context. 
UGANDA’S PILOT DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
THE DFID OFFICE IN CHINA, VIA THE DFID OFFICE IN UGANDA, informed MAAIF of 
its plan to engage China in TDC; MAAIF wasted little time in responding positively to 
this invitation. Before their trip to Beijing for the second Africa-Britain-China 
CASE STUDY:
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Conference on Agriculture and Fisheries in November 2012, the Ugandan delegation 
gathered interesting project proposals within MAAIF. During the conference, a project 
proposal on cassava production garnered Chinese interest. After the signing of 
AgriTT’s MOU at the end of the conference, MAAIF commenced designing a formal 
proposal based on that particular cassava project.
Meanwhile, a tender went out to recruit an intermediary to take charge of daily 
management of the entire AgriTT program, including the pilot in Uganda. Landel 
Mills, a London-based development consultancy company, was chosen. Their first step 
was to create the Program Management Office (PMO) in March, 2013 and on March 13th, 
the PMO director went on his first trip to Beijing. He visited the European Affairs 
Bureau, within MOA’s Department of International Cooperation, and the FECC in 
order to clarify responsibilities, establish work plans, and facilitate an exploratory 
mission for Chinese experts to Uganda.20 From late April to early May of 2013, the 
MAAIF took Chinese experts to visit different potential implementing partners in order 
to convince the Chinese delegation of the pilot project’s feasibility. After this trip, the 
project proposal, budget, and work plans were revised several times until they were 
finally approved by the Steering Committee in late 2013. According to the 2013 AgriTT 
annual review the development and approval of these work plans, which required 
frequent multi-site consultations, in all took about one year to complete. The 2013 
annual review also raised the risk level of the Ugandan pilot from “medium” to “high” 
in terms of project coordination and management obstacles.21 
The Ugandan pilot was funded almost exclusively by DFID, with a promised 
contribution of £1.25 million, instead of a joint China-Britain funding pool. However, 
according to an interview with an employee from the PMO’s Uganda office, the pilot 
project suffered budget cuts due to implementations delays.22 The Chinese financial 
contribution was relatively marginal, only covering smaller components like the 
second Africa-Britain-China Conference on Agriculture and Fisheries.23 As for MAAIF, 
they were only responsible for paying the taxes imposed on imported Chinese 
machinery.24
OBJECTIVES
THE PILOT WAS IMPLEMENTED ACROSS FOUR DISTRICTS in Western Uganda: 
Hoima, Masindi, Buliisa, and Kiryandongo. Based on information gathered from 
interviewees, these four Western districts were selected because other development 
partners in Eastern and Northern Uganda, which are the country’s main cassava 
growing regions, had already undertaken similar projects.25 MAAIF, therefore, wanted 
to expand cassava into Western Uganda. Of the four districts, cassava is only the main 
crop in Kiryandongo, with maize as the dominant crop in the other three districts. This 
may in part explain why, by the time of the fieldwork, the project was performing the 
best in Kiryandongo. 
Although China did not 
make any direct financial 
contributions to this pilot 
project and therefore 
assumed a minimal role in 
financial management, one 
can reasonably conclude 
that TDC can contribute to 
a better understanding 
among Chinese partners of 
traditional donors’ logic 
and project management 
practices.
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The pilot project focused on the entire cassava production value chain, 
specifically:
1.	 Productivity: propagation of clean cassava cutting and change in unit yield in 
the pilot area
2.	 Processing: organization of farmer groups to improve harvesting, post-
harvesting, and primary processing of fresh cassava
3.	 Transformation: development of value-added cassava products
These three objectives were largely targeted at addressing difficulties facing the 
Ugandan cassava sector, including a lack of disease-free planting materials, the 
declining productivity of cassava due to disease, and farmers’ limited awareness of 
cassava’s value chain, as identified in MAAIF’s second Agricultural Sector Development 
Strategy and Investment Plan (2010-2015).26 The two NDPs in 2010 and 2015 also 
emphasized cassava’s important role in ensuring food security in Uganda, and called 
for additional efforts to explore cassava’s commercial and industrial potential in 
Uganda’s economic development. 
Regarding the first objective, the project aimed to promote one particular cassava 
variety, NASE 14. NASE 14 was developed by the Ugandan National Agricultural 
Research Organization (NARO) and has two important advantages: high yield and 
disease resistance. It can resist two of the principal cassava diseases, mosaic and 
brown streak disease, with the latter disease having posed frequent problems for 
Ugandan farmers since the 1990s. Because these particular cassava diseases are not 
found in China, Chinese experts were unable to provide any technical assistance in 
this regard. In order to promote the NASE 14 variety, 10 farmer groups composed of at 
least 25 farmers each were to be established. Each group was meant to contribute 
about 5 hectares of land to create a mother garden, in which NASE 14 was to be planted. 
Later on, farmers located outside these groups were expected to purchase the NASE 14 
grown in the mother gardens, propagating the use of NASE 14 on a larger scale. 
An additional component of the first objective was to demonstrate to local farmers 
the possibility of using mechanized methods to cultivate cassava on a large scale. 
Chinese experts were expected to use imported Chinese machines to create two 
demonstration plots in each of the four districts. Preliminary trainings were to be 
organized for local farmers in each district to demonstrate mechanized farming’s 
efficiency as well as some planting methods used in China. 
The second objective was to teach local farmers more effective and efficient ways 
of drying and processing the fresh cassava root. Improved drying and processing 
methods allow for the root to be made into high-quality cassava chips and flour that 
fetch better prices in local markets, and can also later be transformed into other 
value-added cassava food products. As a staple food in Uganda, cassava has always 
been processed in a rudimentary way. It is typically peeled manually and dried in the 
sun, making effective processing dependent on inconsistent weather conditions. The 
project intended to import four dryers, one for each pilot district. Within the districts, 
different farmer groups were encouraged to write business proposals, with a dryer 
awarded to those who put forward the best business plans. 
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In terms of the third objective, the pilot aimed to develop value-added cassava 
products. Given Uganda’s low level of industrialization, the project decided to focus 
only on food products, though cassava can be used in other industries. Some local 
enterprises were expected to join in this process to develop new food products – 
including some snack and biscuit lines – with technical support from Chinese experts.  
Contrary to some media reports, it is unlikely that the goal of increased Ugandan 
cassava production was to facilitate the products’ export to China. Mother gardens 
(nurseries to supply improved cassava) were designed to sell cassava stems primarily to 
local district farmers, and the cassava food products developed by this project were 
also designed for local markets. However, it is worth noting that this pilot project 
could have certain regional impacts; for instance, some Rwandese farmers, hearing of 
the diseases-resistant NASE 14, also purchased cassava stems from mother gardens.27 
MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE
AS MENTIONED PREVIOUSLY, AGRITT’S DAILY MANAGEMENT was contracted to 
Landel Mills which then established the PMO. The PMO’s head office was located in 
Beijing, with additional offices in Kampala and London. The PMO’s three primary 
responsibilities consisted of: 1) managing and disbursing funds, including signing 
contracts with implementing partners; 2) developing annual work plans and budgets 
with the implementing partners; and 3) coordinating the implementation of the 
project and taking charge of regular supervision and evaluation. Overall, the PMO 
played a crucial role in the implementation of the Ugandan pilot. 
A steering committee oversaw the PMO and the implementing partners, and was 
responsible for high-level decision-making. The committee was comprised of 
representatives from the three partner countries, and their respective institutions, 
including MAAIF, NARO, MOA (usually represented by one person from the European 
Affairs Bureau and another person other from the FECC), and DFID-China.28 The 
committee met once a year and was in charge of approving annual work plans, 
budgets, and all significant changes related to the project. 
Objectives Content Ugandan Partners Chinese Support
1.	Productivity Propagation of clean cassava cuttings; increased yield 
National Agricultural Research 
Institute (NARO); 4 local districts
Production machines (plow, planter 
etc.); Chinese technicians
2.	Processing Improvement of primary processing of fresh cassava root
African Innovation Institute 
(AFrII); 4 local districts
Processing machines (batch dryer); 
Chinese technicians
3.	Transformation Development of added-value cassava food products
Makerere University's Department 
of Food Technology and Nutrition
Snack and biscuit production lines; 
Chinese technicians
Table 2: Outline of the Ugandan Pilot
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Although MOFCOM is the primary ministry that manages China’s foreign aid 
budget, its participation in this steering committee proved to be sporadic. For 
instance, it was absent from the latest meeting held in Malawi in March 2016. 
According to DFID-China, given the large number of aid projects under MOFCOM’s 
supervision, it was impossible for MOFCOM staff to be involved in every project; 
MOFCOM’s level of participation also depended on MOFCOM officials’ interests in this 
trilateral initiative.29 The Chinese Embassy’s Economic and Commercial Counselor’s 
Office in Uganda also seemed to play a marginal role: it did not participate in the 
steering committee and its contact with the project was limited to courtesy visits by 
Chinese experts within their first days of arrival in Uganda.30 In principle, DFID-
Uganda was also a member of the committee. However, it was not very active and was 
also absent from the annual meeting in Malawi in 2016. This tepid engagement could 
be attributed to the fact that this triangular project did not fit into DFID-Uganda’s 
working goals. Instead, the TDC was initiated by DFID-China to realize its own 
strategic goal of engaging China in development cooperation. Consequently, DFID-
Uganda, already burdened with bilateral development projects, was not obliged to 
actively engage with this project and seemed to do so only at the request of their 
Beijing-based colleagues. However, in the early stages of this project, DFID-Uganda did 
play an important role in soliciting Uganda’s interests and providing advice on 
financial management.31 
IMPLEMENTING PARTNERS AND THEIR ROLES 
COORDINATED BY MAAIF, THE UGANDAN GOVERNMENT’S signatory of the AgriTT 
MOU, the pilot included four principal Ugandan implementing partners. Within 
MAAIF itself, responsibility for coordination was assigned to the Directorate of Crop 
Resources. The remaining three Ugandan partners were each engaged in realizing one 
of the three project objectives: increased productivity, processing, and development of 
value added food products. As the implementing partner in charge of improving 
productivity, NARO provided disease-free cassava stems, NASE 14.32 The African 
Innovation Institute (AFrII), a Ugandan NGO specialized in developing the cassava 
value chain, lead processing efforts. Pulling from its experience with another cassava-
focused project, C:AVA (Cassava: Adding value for Africa), AFrII organized local farmers 
in groups and provided training on cassava processing and business management. 
Finally, Makerere University’s Department of Food Science and Nutrition was involved 
in developing cassava food products with Chinese experts.33 In addition to these four 
partners, local districts, particularly district production officers and district 
agricultural officers, were required to mobilize farmers to form groups in support of 
activities carried out by Chinese experts as well as other implementing partners, and to 
encourage local agricultural extension workers to join planned technical trainings. 
On the Chinese side, as the party in charge of implementing China’s foreign aid 
projects in agriculture, the FECC constituted the primary Chinese implementing 
partner. In principle, the FECC was responsible for identifying suitable Chinese 
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experts and technicians, providing them with cultural and linguistic training, and 
organizing their replacement when necessary. The terms of reference for recruiting 
Chinese experts were prepared by the PMO in consultation with both MAAIF and the 
FECC.34 The FECC then selected candidates and the PMO signed consultancy contracts 
with Chinese technicians upon arrival.35 By the time fieldwork was conducted in May 
2016, six Chinese experts specialized mainly in cassava planting and processing had 
been sent to Uganda for missions lasting at least one month.
Technicians and experts were selected primarily from Guangxi University and the 
Chinese Academy of Tropical Agricultural Sciences in Hainan Province, as both 
institutions had been mandated to send experts to support the project. The choice of 
these two institutes was deliberate as Guangxi and Hainan are the two principal 
cassava production regions in China. Additionally, these two institutes belong to 
China’s National Agricultural Research System (CNARS) of Cassava, which is 
institutionally composed of one research center and a number of trial stations. MOA 
created CNARS in 2011 with the goal of promoting agro-food industries and agricultural 
technologies on 50 different crops. It fit well with the value chain approach advocated 
by this pilot project, and provided a talent pool from which the FECC could draw 
pertinent experts.
The FECC also provided administrative support to facilitate the export of Chinese 
machines to help achieve the projects’ objectives. TAGRIM, a Guangxi-based company, 
provided a plow, tiller, ridger, planter, and a harvester in addition to committing to 
send technicians to Uganda to deal with any technical difficulties that might arise in 
using the machinery. During the author’s fieldwork in May 2016, dryers for the snacks 
production line had also been ordered.
PROJECT PROGRESS AS OF MAY 2016
BY THE TIME OF THIS FIELDWORK IN MAY 2016, the project’s performance on the 
third objective was considered by many interviewees to be the most promising. With 
the assistance of a Chinese expert on food products from Guangxi University, Makerere 
University’s Department of Food Science succeeded in producing cassava biscuit and 
snack samples. The department made public announcements in local newspapers to 
recruit interested companies to join the project. Additionally, two companies, House 
of Rusa and Family Diet, joined the local team to learn relevant techniques to produce 
food products on a larger scale for local markets.36 Ideally, these food samples should 
have been made from the cassava roots produced by the pilot project. However, due to 
the delay in implementing the first phase, the samples were developed using cassava 
roots produced by the aforementioned C:AVA project.37 
Despite delays, the implementation of the first phase had, by and large, met initial 
project expectations. Due to coordination difficulties outlined in the next section, the 
project did not start planting cassava in mother gardens until October 2014, with some 
RESULTS
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mother gardens planted as late as December 2014, when Uganda had already entered 
the dry season unsuitable for cassava cultivation. Given the delays, some mobilized 
farmer groups had already planted other crops in lands that were originally designated 
to be mother gardens, while other farmers decided not to plant cassava taking into 
consideration the onset of the dry season. Ultimately, according to the interviewee 
from the PMO’s Uganda office, the project established 37 mother gardens on 337 acres 
of land.38 Two Chinese technicians helped with the planting process by demonstrating 
techniques to local farmers, such as the ridge and furrow method. As expected, the 
project saw some performance variation between different pilot districts. Kiryandongo 
was considered to be the most successful district, because the farmer groups there 
planted cassava earlier than other districts, before the beginning of the dry season. In 
addition, Kiryandongo has also traditionally grown cassava, which may have impacted 
their level of preparation prior to project implementation. During the author’s visits to 
farmer groups in Kiryandongo, the increase in cassava yields from their mother 
gardens encouraged many of them to clear additional lands to plant the NASE 14 
variety. 
The project also made steady progress establishing the demonstration plots for 
mechanized farming. MAAIF insisted on including this component despite DFID-
China’s initial hesitation. During the Steering Committee’s annual meeting in Uganda 
in March 2015 members decided to establish two demonstration plots in Kiryandongo. 
With imported production machines and one locally procured tractor, two Chinese 
technicians established two plots in Kiryandongo during their time in Uganda between 
October 2015 and January 2016. At the Steering Committee’s 2016 annual meeting, they 
agreed to establish similar demonstration plots in the remaining districts, given the 
success of the two plots in Kiryandongo.39 By the time of the author’s fieldwork, 
another two-person team of Chinese technicians was busy establishing the remaining 
demonstration plots in the other three districts, expected to be finished by June 2016. 
Local farmers first cleared the demonstration plots manually. When the Chinese 
technicians arrived, they used the tractors and the imported plow and tiller to re-clean 
the field, and then employed the ridger to form ridges. This usually took one to two 
days, depending on weather conditions. Once the ridges were formed, Chinese 
technicians would use the planter to plant cassava roots in parts of the field, and left 
the rest to be planted during the training sessions. There was one training session in 
each district, during which the Chinese technicians first gave a brief PowerPoint 
presentation about some cassava planting methods used in China, and went on to 
demonstrate how the machines worked. The training was aimed at showing the 
efficiency of mechanized farming within a limited time frame. 
As of March 2016, the project had not made much progress toward the second 
objective, processing cassava. The main reason for the delay was due to the difficulty in 
identifying suitable dryers to import from China, which will be discussed in more 
detail below. However, AFrII did manage to organize and host a business management 
training to raise local farmers’ awareness about cassava’s commercial value.
The financial management 
system was described as 
“rigid”, “demanding”, 
“slow in decision-making”, 
and requiring too much 
paperwork in order to have 
earmarked funds released.
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FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT: A DIFFICULT OBSTACLE TO OVERCOME 
AFTER THE SIGNING OF THE AGRITT MOU IN NOVEMBER 2012 and the 
establishment of the PMO in March 2013, the three countries did not come to an 
agreement on the final development plan for the pilot until the end of 2013. With a 
plan finally in place, the pilot should have entered the implementation stage in 2014. 
However, the parties encountered significant difficulties in creating a financial 
management system capable of satisfying all parties’ demands. In addition, a highly 
publicized discovery of donor funding embezzlement in Uganda from 2012 further 
hindered implementation of the pilot.40 Although the case did not involve DFID funds, 
DFID proceeded to suspend £4 million in aid earmarked for the Ugandan prime 
minister’s office after that office was implicated in the scandal. DFID established an 
independent audit to investigate the alleged fraud, and announced on November 16, 
2012 that it had halted all direct aid payment to the Ugandan government while 
investigations continued.41 This decision came only four days after the announcement 
of AgriTT at the second Africa-Britain-China Conference on Agriculture and Fisheries, 
and therefore posed additional implementation challenges.
According to the contract between DFID and Landel Mills, the PMO was in charge 
of developing proper fund disbursement mechanisms. Initially, DFID-China asked 
each party about its opinions on financial management, and MAAIF suggested that the 
budget earmarked to the PMO Uganda office should be transferred directly to its own 
account instead.42 DFID-Uganda did not reject this proposition right away, however, 
due diligence exercises later showed significant reservations about the integrity of 
MAAIF’s internal financial management system.43
Against the background of DFID’s decision to suspend all its direct aid to Uganda 
and the result of due diligence exercises, the PMO showed extra prudence when it 
came to funding disbursements and the creation of a specifically allocated account for 
those funds. Without this account, there was concern that “the money would be 
thrown into the sea and nobody could supervise it”.44 Discussions among MAAIF, the 
PMO, and DFID-China about opening a designated account proved time-consuming. 
The Ugandan side sent conflicting messages regarding the possibility of creating such 
an account. Later, it appeared that MAAIF needed to first obtain approval from the 
Ugandan Ministry of Finance to create said account; however the Ministry of Finance 
was not present in the second Africa-Britain-China Conference and was not a signatory 
to the AgriTT MOU.45 In other words, the MOU signed by MAAIF did not allow it to 
open a designated account, which would require a separate agreement signed between 
DFID and the Ugandan Ministry of Finance. Ultimately, MAAIF was unable to open a 
designated account for the pilot project and the PMO considered alternate fund 
disbursement methods, to either AFrII or Makerere University, which, according to the 
due diligence exercises, had relatively solid financial management systems. After many 
consultations and an open bid, the PMO recruited a local accounting firm to serve as 
an intermediary to receive funds from the PMO and disburse them to Ugandan 
implementing partners. 
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While the PMO eventually established a financial management system that 
conformed to DFID rules, MAAIF experienced significant difficulties in adapting to this 
financial management system. In one AgriTT annual review, an interviewee states: 
“given the trilateral nature of the program, there has been a degree of lesson learning 
needed from the partners in terms of financial management and financial reporting 
which is compliant with the DFID standards and expectations.”46 The financial 
management system was described as “rigid”, “demanding”, “slow in decision-
making”, and requiring too much paperwork in order to have earmarked funds 
released.47 
These difficulties engendered a sense of frustration and powerlessness among 
some Ugandan partners. They believed that the required financial formalities did not 
facilitate the disbursement of funds, which should have been disbursed in line with 
work plans approved by the steering committee. Without timely disbursement, they 
argued that planned calendar activities could not be carried out on time, which in turn 
posed additional challenges to the implementation of an agricultural pilot hinging on 
seasonal activity. Tensions were triggered by the different priorities between the PMO 
and MAAIF. While the former was primarily concerned with establishing a financial 
management system that ensured the proper use of DFID’s funds in Uganda, the latter 
prioritized the necessity of disbursing funds according to the agreed calendars, so that 
project activities could be carried out on time. 
DFID-China recognized that there were important disagreements between DFID 
and MAAIF regarding financial management. “We have different ideas. Given DFID is 
financing this project, we are obliged to follow our rules and PMO should be 
responsible in front of DFID,” explained one interviewee from DFID-China, who also 
admitted that the financial management system established by the PMO did have 
some disadvantages.48 According to AgriTT annual reviews and the mid-term review, 
the financial management system helped avoid fiduciary risks to the detriment of 
efficiency. “PMO and Landel Mills continue to improve this system… which however is 
still quite different from what MAAIF is used to,” added this interviewee.49
During 2014, the pilot achieved little progress in its first year of implementation. 
The disagreement on financial management was one of the key reasons, as the “PMO 
did not dare to disburse funds until it had sufficient confidence on the recipients’ 
capability in financial management.”50 Frustration about the lack of project progress 
became so great that Ugandan staff started to question whether this project would 
actually continue. In addition, Chinese personnel changes included replacing a staff 
member initially involved in establishing this trilateral project. The new official was 
pessimistic about the project’s prospects.51 There were also other practical challenges. 
For instance, against the background of the anti-corruption campaign in China, it took 
longer for Chinese experts holding “service passports (公务护照)” to get official 
permission to go on a mission abroad. Moreover, the first two Chinese experts 
dispatched had never worked abroad and underwent a certain level of cultural shock 
in Uganda.52 
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Because the author was unable to conduct interviews with staff from FECC, MOA, 
and MOFCOM, this report cannot adequately discuss the position of the Chinese side 
regarding the disagreement on financial management. Given that the pilot was 
primarily funded by DFID and the role of Chinese partners was primarily limited to 
technical assistance, it is likely that the Chinese side, especially in the daily 
management of this project, tried to keep a certain distance from financial 
management disagreements. However, the Chinese side was obliged to engage in the 
discussion during the Steering Committee’s annual meetings. Although even on these 
occasions their opinions appeared to be mixed.53 
The two Chinese technicians acknowledged that the financial management 
system lacked efficiency, and that there had been delays in payment.54 In keeping with 
the official Chinese position on trilateral cooperation, they suggested publicly that the 
Chinese side should take into consideration the opinions of their Ugandan partners. 
However, in private, they expressed concerns about whether the funding would have 
been properly used if it had been directly transferred to the Ugandan side, given 
widespread corruption in Uganda. 
Based on their experiences in the field, the Chinese technicians formed their own 
perspectives on the political context in Uganda, and shared similar concerns with 
DFID, questioning the impact of the local political context on the sustainability of the 
project. They understood the rationale behind the establishment of a solid and strict 
financial management system in a country where corruption remains rampant. In this 
regard, although China did not make any direct financial contributions to this pilot 
project and therefore assumed a minimal role in financial management, one can 
reasonably conclude that TDC can contribute to a better understanding among 
Chinese partners of traditional donors’ logic and project management practices. It 
remains to be seen whether or not this results in a gradual shift of the Chinese 
position towards traditional donors. If China’s position does evolve in this direction, it 
will be confronted with the same dilemma faced by traditional donors, that is, the 
balance between project implementation efficiency and the need to avoid fiduciary 
risks. 
DOES TRIANGULAR DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION CONTRIBUTE TO A 
MORE HORIZONTAL NORTH-SOUTH RELATIONSHIP?
TDC IS BELIEVED TO BE BASED ON THE PRINCIPLES of partnership, equality, and 
mutual interests, in addition to conceiving of North-South relations as “a form of 
dynamic process composed of exchanges, complementarities and inter-
dependences”.55 One oft-claimed “advantage” of TDC is that it could contribute to a 
more horizontal relationship between traditional donors and recipient countries.56 The 
incorporation of emerging donors in triangular arrangements plays an important role 
because their similarities with recipient countries are likely to reinforce the 
negotiation position of recipient countries and help remedy the unequal power 
relations between traditional donors and recipient nations. These similarities are 
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mostly predicated on their shared identity as developing countries, their common 
history of colonization, and their similar socio-economic development contexts, all of 
which are often underlined by emerging donors in their own bilateral aid programs 
and development partnership discourse. 
However, interviews with the implementing partners in Uganda suggested that the 
perception of an unequal relationship between the traditional donor and the recipient 
country persisted, despite the trilateral nature of this pilot project. This perception was 
due primarily to the disagreements about financial management. For instance, 
MAAIF’s difficulty in adapting to the financial management system, which it deemed 
inefficient, gave rise to a strong sense of frustration. The rules and procedures required 
by this system were referred to as “conditions” imposed by DFID, while DFID was also 
described as an “invisible partner” and a “hidden hand”.57 This invisibility can be 
partly attributed to the management structure of this project, which appeared to limit 
the possibility of direct communication between MAAIF and DFID during the 
implementation stage. DFID-China lacked the human resources necessary to directly 
manage this project, as it only had one staff member in charge of the entire 
cooperation between DFID and China in agriculture and natural resources. The daily 
management of this pilot project was therefore contracted to Landel Mills, which was 
required to manage it in compliance with DFID’s regulations. With this management 
structure in place, from the Ugandan point of view, the PMO established by Landel 
Mills served as the spokesperson for DFID.58 Each time MAAIF disagreed with the PMO, 
especially when it came to financial issues, it tended to attribute the problems to DFID. 
DFID is characterized by the Ugandan project partner as a Northern development 
agency detached from the local context of the South, a stereotypical paternalistic 
figure of traditional North-South development aid narratives. Occasionally, the 
conditions put in place by the financial management system were described as 
symbolizing DFID’s mistrust vis-à-vis the Ugandan side.59
From the Ugandan point of view this triangular project did not contribute to a 
more horizontal relationship with DFID. On the contrary, what we observe is a sense of 
frustration by MAAIF resulting primarily from its subordination to the financial 
management structure put in place by DFID. In theory, as stipulated in the Bogotá 
Statement, TDC is regarded as a process led by the Southern countries.60 However, in 
practice with this particular triangular project, DFID served as a traditional donor, who 
financed the project, had the power to control the flow of financial resources, and held 
other partners accountable.61
The presence of China as an emerging donor did not seem to have transformed 
the Ugandan perception of an unequal relationship between DFID and MAAIF. 
Emerging donors, including China, often highlight their shared identity as developing 
countries and their common histories of colonization and imperialism with recipient 
countries. However, these identity “similarities” – which themselves are debatable – do 
not necessarily translate, in a trilateral arrangement, into a natural alliance. As 
mentioned previously, the opinions of Chinese participants were divided on financial 
management and were not automatically sympathetic to their Ugandan partners.62 
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The arrangement of this pilot project allowed China to largely distance itself from 
the tug-of-war related to financial management, which also helped distance China 
from Uganda’s criticism of DFID. The project was almost exclusively funded by DFID, 
not by a China-UK joint funding pool, and China’s role was essentially limited to 
providing technical assistance. This arrangement does not reflect the more balanced 
and integrated form of TDC, which, according to Li and Bonschab, is when the three 
parties work together on each stage of the project, including its planning, financing, 
implementation, and monitoring.63
Given that this pilot project is one of the first trilateral projects that China has 
supported in collaboration with a traditional donor in Africa, it is perhaps 
understandable that China has adopted a prudent approach by limiting its 
engagement. Nevertheless, as shown by this project, this “weaker” modality of 
trilateral cooperation is less likely to contribute to effective mutual dialogue and 
learning among the parties. This pilot also made it difficult to observe the potential 
advantages that trilateral cooperation could bring, such as the improvement of 
relations between traditional donors and recipients.  
In this project, China’s role was akin to that of a technical assistance contractor. 
They did not engage substantially with either their British or Ugandan partners over 
differences or disagreements on development policies or project management 
approaches. This weaker modality could serve to reduce potential difficulties that 
China encounters in trilateral cooperation with traditional donors and make trilateral 
cooperation more attractive to China. More importantly, it also gives Beijing more 
maneuverability, permitting it to observe and learn from its DFID colleagues, without 
giving the impression of being in collusion with traditional donors and thus 
perpetuating a Northern  domination of development norms, policies, and practices. 
However, herein lies the contradiction. By limiting its role to technical assistance 
without a deep engagement in other project aspects, it is unlikely that China will bring 
any important changes to the vertical relations between Britain and Uganda (or 
between any other traditional donors and recipient countries) embodied in this 
project. Additionally, the fact that this project was launched by DFID-China instead of 
by DFID-Uganda, indicated that this initiative was targeted at engaging China in 
development cooperation. It is very unlikely that China and the UK, in their decision to 
establish this pilot project, would prioritize the need to make aid relations between 
Britain and Uganda more horizontal. 
ARE CHINESE TECHNOLOGIES SUITABLE FOR THE UGANDAN CONTEXT?
AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT OF THIS PILOT PROJECT was the import of Chinese 
technologies, particularly Chinese machines deemed suitable for use within the 
Ugandan context. The rationale behind this project design holds that China shares 
more similarities in terms of agricultural development experience with Uganda than 
the UK, therefore, Beijing could contribute know-how and technologies that better 
respond to Ugandan agricultural development needs. This line of reasoning was also 
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evident in one of the short speeches given by a member of the pilot management team 
during a training session, which took place in Biiso on May 26, 2016:
“…if we look at Europe, many of the machines used by the farmers are very 
big. They are not suitable to the small-scale agriculture in Uganda. On the 
contrary, in China, many technologies are developed for small-scale 
agriculture and also for the environments that are similar to Uganda…”
However, the implementation process has shown that the reality is much more 
complex, and the supposed similarities between China and Uganda in agricultural 
development does not necessarily guarantee the adaptability of Chinese technical 
assistance to the Ugandan local context. 
In late April 2015, a team composed of representatives from MAAIF, AFrII, and the 
four local districts went to Guangxi, China to identify appropriate cassava cultivation 
and processing machines to use for the pilot, particularly the cassava dryer, which 
Uganda previously lacked. The identification of cassava cultivation machines went 
relatively smoothly. The delegation was taken to visit TAGRIM, a Guangxi-based 
agricultural machine producer, where a plow, tiller, ridger, planter, and a harvester 
were chosen.
However, the team encountered greater difficulties in identifying a suitable 
processing machine. During their initial visits to several cassava processing facilities in 
Guangxi, the team’s first impression was that these facilities, which were able to 
process between 100 and 200 metric tons of manioc per day, were simply too big for 
Uganda. In TAGRIM, they were presented with a bean peeler, cutter, and dryer, which 
had the capacity to produce about 1.5 tons of cassava chips per day. Initially, this 
small-scale machine appeared to be suitable; however, after careful examination, the 
adaptability of this machine to the Ugandan context was called into question.64
Firstly, cassava is primarily a staple food in Uganda, whereas it is grown mainly for 
industrial use, not for food consumption in China. Consequently, concern arose 
around whether a processing machine designed for industrial use could produce 
cassava chips that conformed to Ugandan food safety standards. Two factors led to this 
concern. First, the peeler could not peel off all the non-edible cassava skin. In order to 
resolve this problem, the Ugandan delegation decided not to purchase the peeler and 
to opt for manual peeling. Second, both the bean dryer and the blades of the cutter 
were made from iron, which were likely to rust. The delegation discussed with TAGRIM 
the possibility of using stainless steel in all the parts of these two machines in direct 
contact with cassava.
With these two problems solved, the team was confronted with another even 
bigger obstacle, related the bean dryer’s energy source. Coal, as the principal energy 
source in China, remains accessible and cheap within the Chinese market, and 
therefore is used to power the bean dryer. Uganda, however, does not have any coal 
deposits. Two solutions were proposed, although without success. One was to use 
wood. However, considering its environmental impact, especially within the 
framework of a development aid project, this proposition was rejected. The other was 
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to rely on briquettes. This was also proved to be infeasible, as the bean dryer needed to 
operate for 14-16 hours per day and for each hour, 100 kilos of briquettes would be 
needed. The cost and logistics for this method were thus deemed too great. 
It was during their second trip to Guangxi in January 2016 that the team finally 
found a solution. The director of the Starch Research Institution at Guangxi University 
suggested another type of small-scale dryer – the batch dryer –, which was able to 
efficiently retain heat through insulation and, more importantly, be fueled by 
agricultural waste. Some parts of the batch dryers needed to be retrofitted with 
stainless steel components to ensure the quality of the final product, however. During 
the author’s fieldwork, this batch dryer was still being shipped to Uganda, and it 
remained to be seen whether or not it could be adapted to the Ugandan context. 
However, in theory, the biggest obstacle of finding an energy source was overcome. 
Reflecting on this experience, one interviewee said,
“I have always thought that no matter which type of equipment, or what 
your needs are, you could always find them in China, but this is not always 
the case, especially if it is about small scale [equipment] for processing 
cassava. It is not that easy. And the dynamics are also very different; 
especially when it comes to energy.”65
AFrII spent almost nine months looking for suitable alternative energy sources to 
power the bean dryer, posing significant delays for the second phase of the project. 
This episode demonstrates that the supposed similarities in terms of agricultural 
development between China and Uganda need to be put into perspective. While 
cassava is an important root crop in the agriculture sector primarily composed of 
small-scale farmers in both Uganda and China, the differences in cassava cultivation 
and processing are still significant. Taking into account these key differences proved to 
be crucial in order to ensure the applicability of the proposed Chinese technologies 
and machines to the Ugandan context. Emerging donors like China, compared to 
Northern donors, enjoy more recent development experiences and have encountered 
similar development challenges faced by recipient countries of the South. However, 
this does not necessarily make technology transfer any easier. What is needed is a deep 
understanding of recipient countries’ local contexts in order to identify which type of 
technical assistance emerging donors can offer that will be best suited to the needs of 
recipient countries.
AGAINST THE BROADER CONTEXT OF DONOR diversification, TDC has received 
renewed interest from the donor community to bridge traditional North-South 
cooperation with growing South-South cooperation; however, little fieldwork-based 
research has been carried out to empirically investigate TDC, not to mention Chinese 
engagement in this modality of development cooperation. This paper has attempted to 
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fill this research gap, focusing on China’s trilateral development project with the UK in 
Uganda’s agricultural sector.
In this TDC project, transaction and coordination costs proved to be high. 
Enormous time and effort is required so that various partners with different 
operational rationales and methods, in three different countries, are able to reach a 
consensus on a common work plan, administrative rules, and financial procedures. 
The beginning of this project was characterized by a time-consuming, back-and-forth 
negotiation process, which engendered significant implementation delays; and the 
under-performance of the project during the first year even led DFID-China to consider 
suspending it.  There is a need to avoid conceptualizing the implementation of TDC 
projects as a linear process, but to allow enough space and time for test and trials early 
on in the project design.
Due to implementation delays, the Steering Committee decided during their 
March 2016 annual meeting to extend the project to the end of 2016. By the time of 
fieldwork in May 2016, a number of interviewees in Uganda suggested that there had 
been no serious discussion about any follow-up project, and some advised that if DFID 
decided to withdraw its support China should consider pursuing bilateral cooperation 
with Uganda. Although, the interview with DFID-China suggested that the 
experimental TDC pilot would have finished by the end of this project, and that DFID 
would need time to digest and reflect on the engagement before starting new 
initiatives. Looking back now, these predictions by interviewees have come true and 
there has indeed been no follow-up project after the AgriTT finally concluded in March 
2017. 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Given the above findings and field observations in Uganda, this paper proposes the 
following four policy recommendations for future trilateral development projects:
1.	 TDC	planning	should	build	in	ample	time	during	its	implementation	to	
attend	to	the	higher	transaction	and	coordination	costs	associated	with	
involving	a	larger	number	of	interested	parties.	As demonstrated by this pilot 
project, the beginning of a trilateral development project is underlined by 
coordination problems resulting from different policies, procedures, and 
working methods of various institutions involved. More time should be 
allowed for them to seek and build consensus on processes and project 
implementation systems. It is highly likely the early stage of TDC projects will 
be faced with delays and setbacks, therefore, participant countries need to 
take into due consideration the possibility of delays in the project design so 
that they can be well prepared both psychologically and in terms of resources. 
Instead of being seen as a linear process, a trilateral development project, 
particularly a pilot one, should be conceptualized as a dynamic interaction 
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among different partners, which necessarily entail tests and trials as well as 
frequent back-and-forth project revisions and adjustments. 
2.	 Extensive	research	and	analysis	is	required	to	understand	the	recipient	
countries’	development	needs	in	order	for	the	technical	assistance	provided	
to	be	appropriate,	properly	targeted,	and	contextualized.	This field research 
shows that, while it is likely that emerging donors share similarities with 
recipient countries in terms of development challenges and experiences, and 
therefore have more know-how and expertise to be harnessed, the key to 
ensure a successful transfer of agricultural technologies lies more in 
understanding their development differences.
3.	 Recipient	countries	need	to	play	a	dominant	role	from	the	inception	of	
trilateral	projects,	so	that	donors’	interests,	policies,	and	priorities	will	not	
take	precedence	over	those	of	recipient	countries.	Current trilateral projects 
are far too often implemented as the result of initiatives from the donor side, 
for the sake of enhancing collaboration between traditional donors and 
emerging Southern donors. There is a risk that TDCs will simply become 
arrangements financed by traditional donors, outsourced to emerging donors 
as budget friendly technical contractors, and implemented in recipient 
countries, which remain passive agents in TDC as in traditional North-South 
development cooperation. 
4.	 In	terms	of	financial	arrangements,	traditional	donors,	interested	in	pursuing	
deeper	trilateral	cooperation	with	China,	should	establish	a	joint	pooled	fund	
with	contributions	from	all	three	sides.	While it is highly likely that 
traditional donors remain the key contributors, a joint pooled fund would 
help to guarantee a stable commitment by both China and recipient countries 
to the initiative. Through this mechanism, both traditional donors and China 
could have increased opportunities to engage in a more critical reflection 
about their own development project management, and recipient countries 
could be in a better position to assert their own development priorities and 
agendas. ★
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